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I. Coetzee and Modernis t Wri t ing 
A 
X V L L U D I N G TO CONRAD'S Heart of Darkness, Stephen Watson 
observes that '"all of Europe' . . . has gone into the making of 
Coetzee" (25). Coetzee himself acknowledges the extent to 
which he has been influenced by European and North Ameri-
can literature, particularly modernist writing. In 1993, he wrote 
a deeply appreciative and personal "Homage" to several writers, 
including Rilke, Musil, Pound, Faulkner, Ford and Beckett. 
Coetzee's "Homage" opens with a carefully worded yet striking 
declaration: 
This is about some of the writers without whom I would not be the 
person / am, writers without whom / would, in a certain sense, not 
exist. An acknowledgment, therefore, of literary paternity. 
(1; emphasis added) 
Coetzee's modernist precursors were, then, the fathers who 
provided the indispensable seed not only to create Coetzee as a 
writer ("the person I am"), but his basic being as a subject ("/ 
would . . . exist"). The latter half of this proposition is a sign of 
the intimate relationship that Coetzee perceives between his 
writing and his personhood, specifically of the notion that the 
basis of his self is founded in writing and language. Such a 
belief in the mutual inextricability of language and self 
undergirds the interest in autobiography which Coetzee dem-
onstrates in critical works like Doubling the Point (see 17-9, 243-
93, 391-5) and, indeed, in the latter half of his axiom, "[A] 11 
autobiography is storytelling, all writing is autobiography" 
(Doubling 391). 
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It is thus vital to examine Coetzee's ties to modernism. Neil 
Lazarus, for instance, has argued that white South African writ-
ing in the apartheid era shares with modernist writing the im-
pulse to constitute resistance through textual density and 
difficulty. Lazarus draws upon Adorno's theory of "aesthetic 
modernism" (134) to explain Coetzee's fiction in terms of its 
"modernist irreducibility" (136). Coetzee conceptualizes his re-
lationship to his modernist precursors in far more personal 
terms; in "Homage" he writes that, 
in i 9 6 0 there was no South African writer, novelist or poet, to 
whom I as a young man could turn for a significant and vital lead in 
how to respond to, how to feel about, and therefore how to write 
about, my homeland. Certain times and places throw up writers 
who measure up to the challenge they provide, others do not. 
Australia threw up Patrick White, a writer who could go into the 
heart of the country and return with a version of that country 
powerful enough for his readers to believe in and take a lead from. 
South Africa threw up nothing comparable; or rather, South Africa 
produced two or three or four versions of the land which today I 
regard as, and even thirty years ago suspected to be, false and 
corrupt. . . . The writers I have mentioned thus far taught me to 
hear, feel, write. (8) 
This view of modernist texts may be at variance with the more 
usual suspicion maintained towards metropolitan cultural 
forms. Yet in "Homage," Coetzee makes it clear that in modern-
ism, he found qualities of authenticity and vitality, as well as 
groundbreaking formal innovations, that he could use, both in 
his personal life and in his fiction, to mediate his own percep-
tions of South African reality. As a result of reading Rilke and 
Musil, Coetzee was stirred by the sense "that the possible really 
had no limits"(2), and inspired by the modernist emphasis 
upon "pushing at the bounds of the possible" (3). Adapted to 
the context of Coetzee's homeland, these impressions reappear 
as glimpses of potential escape and freedom amidst the omni-
present strictures of apartheid. Thus Coetzee has said of him-
self as a writer, "I am someone who has intimations of freedom 
(as every chained prisoner has) and constructs representations 
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. . . of people slipping their chains and turning their faces to the 
light" (Doubling 341) . Coetzee constructs these representations 
by refashioning the idioms, motifs, forms and concerns of mod-
ernist writing into a vital and relevant epistemology for the 
latter-day writer. 
In this essay, I will focus on Coetzee's ties with one of the 
modernist fathers he invokes in "Homage": Samuel Beckett, 
who is arguably, with the exception of Kafka, Coetzee's most 
important literary precursor.1 Coetzee has engaged with 
Beckett in an academic context, having written a doctoral thesis 
and several essays on Beckett.2 His comments on Beckett often 
reflect an engagement with his precursor at a more personal 
level: 
Beckett has meant a great deal to me in my own writing — that 
must be obvious. He is a clear influence on my prose. Most writers 
absorb influence through their skin. With me there has also been a 
more conscious process of absorption. Or shall I say, my linguistic 
training enabled me to see the effects I was undergoing with a 
degree of consciousness. The essays I wrote on Beckett's style aren't 
only academic exercises, in the colloquial sense of the word. They 
are also attempts to get closer to a secret, a secret of Beckett's that I 
wanted to make my own. (Doubling 25) 
While many critics have observed the strong influence of 
Beckett on Coetzee's writing, only Paul A. Cantor and Steven G. 
Kellman have examined the relationship at length. Kellman's 
study views both Beckett and Coetzee as translingual writers — 
authors "whose linguistic medium is a matter of choice" (162) 
and whose novels show a primary concern with "the boundaries 
between one language and another, and the limits of language" 
(161). Kellman compares Beckett's decision to write in French 
rather than English, to Coetzee's decision to write in English 
rather than Afrikaans. Cantor focuses on the common 
postmodern features he finds in Beckett and Coetzee, such as 
how both writers put into question their own representations of 
reality. Cantor writes, "Anyone familiar with Beckett will 
recognise that Coetzee derives these narrative techniques and 
strategies from him, especially his trilogy" (87). 
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My essay will focus on Coetzee's highly self-conscious re-writ-
ing of Beckett, especially in Life & Times of Michael K, to demon-
strate that Beckettian paradigms, adapted to the South African 
context, provide Coetzee with vital modes of feeling, perceiving 
and responding to circumstances in his homeland. As a general 
rule, Coetzee simultaneously transplants Beckett's metaphysi-
cal and epistemological paradigms into South African political 
reality, and reconfigures them into moral and political para-
digms more relevant to the South African context. The depth 
of the relationship between the two writers is indicated not only 
by Coetzee's re-writing of Beckett into the broad socio-political 
context of South Africa but also, as we shall see, into his per-
sonal circumstances as a white South African. 
Cantor asserts that "of all [Coetzee's] novels, In the Heart of 
the Country comes closest to Beckett in style and substance" 
(85). It is certainly true that In the Heart of the Country is strongly 
influenced by Beckett's trilogy novels (Molloy, Malone Dies and 
The Unnamable): one can point to its use of the first-person 
monologue, to the radical isolation of the protagonist, Magda, 
and to the narrative's shifting, unreliable realities. Cantor also 
stresses the novel's postmodern "presentation of multiple reali-
ties" (97) as inspired by the Beckett trilogy. While I agree with 
these points, In the Heart of the Country ultimately strikes me as a 
fledgling writer's crude attempt to imitate Beckett's early prose. 
It is in Waiting for the Barbarians, and particularly in Michael K, 
that Coetzee most masterfully adapts Beckettian paradigms to 
interrogate South African political realities. For example, in 
Barbarians, Coetzee uses narrative unreliability to analyze truth-
telling within the context of torture and witness under 
apartheid.3 Beckett's philosophical concern with language and 
truth are thus transplanted by Coetzee into a political context 
where the stakes of narrative veracity and reliability are 
immediate and tangible. 
In this essay, however, I will focus on Michael K, which I 
consider the most Beckettian of Coetzee's novels. I do not 
intend to overlook the influence on this novel of Kafka who is, 
as noted above, Coetzee's other key precursor. As Kellman 
observes, "Michael K . . . is, onomastically, a more obvious child 
of Franz Kafka than Beckett" (165). Merivale, who examines 
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the motifs of the burrow and the hunger artist in Coetzee's 
novel, considers Kafka to be "plainly the central intertextual 
problematic" (152) of Michael K. Coetzee's own appreciation of 
Kafka, found in his comments on his essay on Kafka's "The 
Burrow," suggests how Kafka's short story may be a source of 
inspiration for the theme of escape and freedom in Michael K: 
Kafka at least hints that it is possible, for snatches, however brief, to 
think outside one's own language, perhaps to report back on what 
it is like to think outside language itself... What is interesting is the 
liberating possibility Kafka opens up. (Doubling 198) 
However, Michael K is also saturated with references and 
allusions to the Beckett trilogy, particularly to Molloy, leaving 
the reader with no doubt that Michael K is, to a significant 
extent, a conscious re-writing of Molloy. Like Molloy, Michael K 
recounts the episodic encounters of an itinerant tramp-like 
protagonist who ekes out a vagrant and minimal existence. The 
boggy Irish landscape reappears as the South African Karoo; 
Molloy and Moran's bicycles substitute for K's self-constructed 
barrow; and the famous store of sucking stones in Molloy's 
pockets are transformed into K's "seeds, a different packet of 
seeds for each pocket" (Michael K 182). Both characters con-
clude their much scaled-down odysseys in their mother's 
rooms. The reader of Michael K can delight not only in tracing 
specific references within it to its precursor, Molloy, but also in 
tracing how, as I have noted, Coetzee adapts key Beckettian aes-
thetic and philosophical paradigms to the South African 
context. I will argue that in Michael K, Coetzee specifically 
invokes three Beckettian paradigms — nothingness, minimal-
ism, and indeterminacy — and envisions their operation within 
South African reality. 
Meanwhile, to be aware that Coetzee's literary creation, 
Michael K, is simultaneously a reconfiguration of Kafka's hun-
ger artist and Beckett's Molloy alerts us to Coetzee's conception 
of K as, at one level, a thoroughly intertextual character whose 
identity is derived from multiple precursor texts. Indeed, 
Michael K's function as a locus of different textual strands is 
metafictionally signaled by the ambiguous, anonymous, open-
ended letter - "K" - in his name. 
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II. Personalizing Beckett's Aesthetics of Nothingness 
Coetzee has written that reading Beckett's early prose (as dis-
tinct from Beckett's dramatic writings and his later post-trilogy 
prose) provided him with "a sensuous delight that hasn't 
dimmed over the years" (Doubling 20). Beckett's attraction 
for Coetzee lies not only in the affording of aesthetic delight 
but, intriguingly enough, extends to a level of autobiographical 
identification with Beckett's texts. Coetzee relates to Beckett not 
only as an artistic precursor but also in a personal capacity. He 
finds his social situation in South Africa to be uncannily 
enough mirrored in the plight of Beckett's protagonists.5 
In the brief third-person autobiography in Doubling the Point 
(391-5), Coetzee portrays himself as someone who, because of 
his racial and social marginality, is able to express himself only 
from a position of radical alienation. He represents himself as a 
person characterized by the trademark Beckettian tropes of 
blindness, disability and impotence: 
In the first half of this story — a story spoken in a wavering voice, 
for the speaker is not only blind but, written as he is as a white 
South African into the latter half of the twentieth century, disabled, 
disqualified — a man-who-writes reacts to the situation he finds 
himself in of being without authority, writing without authority. 
(Doubling 392) 
This passage echoes the opening passage of Beckett's trilogy in 
which Molloy describes himself: 
This time, then once more I think, then perhaps a last time, then I 
think it'll be over, with that world too. Premonition of the last but 
one but one. All grows dim. A little more and you'll go blind. It's in 
the head. It doesn't work any more, it says, I don't work anymore. 
You go dumb as well and sounds fade. (Molloy 8) 
While the sense of blindness, disability and impotence in 
Beckett arises largely out of existential alienation, in Coetzee it 
stems from social marginalization. Coetzee's profound sense of 
marginality within South Africa emerges not only from his be-
ing a minority white South African, but also from his experience 
of alienation from the dominant Afrikaner nationalism of his 
early boyhood. He writes of himself in the autobiography that, 
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a sense of being alien goes far back in his memories. . . . His years in 
rural Worcester (1948-1951) as a child from an Afrikaans back-
ground attending English-medium classes, at a time of raging 
Afrikaner nationalism, a time when laws were being concocted to 
prevent people of Afrikaans descent from bringing up their 
children to speak English, provoke in him uneasy dreams of being 
hunted down and accused; by the age of twelve he has a well-
developed sense of social marginality. (People of his parents' kind 
were thundered at from the pulpit as volksverraaiers, traitors of the 
people. . . .) (Doubling 393) 
During his adolescence in Cape Town, Coetzee also feels 
marginalized "as a Protestant enrolled in a Catholic high 
school" (Doubling 393) . Coetzee explains that all of this "con-
firms his (quite accurate) sense of being outside a culture that 
at this moment in history is confidently setting about enforcing 
itself as the core culture of the land" (Doubling 394) . Thus, 
while Coetzee as a white South African may feel disqualified 
from speaking for the black populations in South Africa, his 
sense of impotence is compounded by his simultaneous alien-
ation from the white communities of South Africa. His parents, 
he remembers, "have no foothold in either Afrikaans or English 
social circles" (Doubling 394). Feeling like a virtual outsider 
within his own country, Coetzee the writer can identify with and 
even personalize Beckett's well-known aesthetic creed that al-
though "there is nothing to express, . . . nothing from which to 
express, no power to express," still there is "the obligation to 
express" (Disjecta 139). Coetzee conceives his own predicament 
as a writer to be mirrored in Beckett's gloss of his aesthetic 
creed: 
The situation is that of him who is helpless, cannot act, in the event 
cannot [write], since he is obliged to [write]. The act is of him who, 
helpless, unable to act, acts, in the event [writes], since he is 
obliged to [write]. (Disjecta 142) 4 
Coetzee identifies not only with Beckett's impotence and 
disqualification, but also with his "obligation to express" which, 
remaining a philosophical enigma for Beckett (see Disjecta 
142), takes on a pronounced ethical significance for Coetzee. 
Even though Coetzee may feel a profound sense of social 
alienation, impotence and disqualification, he must still write 
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about the pressing ethical questions of South Africa in the 
apartheid era. We may see Coetzee as a man and writer guilt-
ridden, deeply affected by the injustices and horrors of South 
Africa's racial politics, skeptical of his authority or position to 
say anything, yet faced with "the [moral] obligation to express." 
Beckett's difficulty, impotence and failure of expression along 
with the deeply felt obligation to express, arising from existen-
tial alienation, is adapted to Coetzee's socio-political context, 
where social disqualification exists in tension with a writer's 
moral obligation to respond to social injustice. In Coetzee, we 
find Beckett's aesthetic creed of nothingness re-read as a social 
and moral dilemma. 
While Coetzee ultimately reads Beckett's aesthetics of noth-
ingness as a moral dilemma, he also knows that it can lend itself 
to the formulation of writing (or art) as a tempting form of es-
capism from social reality. Indeed, what may also be attractive 
to Coetzee in Beckett's aesthetics of nothingness (though it is 
not acted upon) is its implied fantasy of constructing a (para-
doxical) fiction of zero as a way of escaping from genuine social 
responsibility and commitment. Through this trick, the writer 
may pretend to fulfill "the obligation to express" while having 
ultimately expressed "nothing." Coetzee sees the possibility of 
"writing of nothing" being realized in Beckett's Watt, a favorite 
work of his in the Beckett corpus. Of this early novel, Coetzee 
has said: 
Watt trembles on the edge of realizing Flaubert's dream of 'a book 
about nothing, a book without external attachments,' held to-
gether by 'the internal force of style.' The rhythm of A against B 
submerges Watt in its lulling plangencies: the style of the book is 
narcissistic reverie. (Doubling47) 
Watt's obsessively self-canceling style, which "pits question against 
proposition, rejoinder against question, objection against rejoin-
der, qualification against objection and so on" (Doubling 47), 
enacts for Coetzee the attractive possibility of a writing of zero. In 
Watt, Beckett may seem to be fulfilling "the obligation to 
express," yet the text ultimately adds up to an expression of 
nothing. Translated into South Africa, Beckett's consummate 
"book about nothing" reveals to Coetzee how the author, while 
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appearing to fulfill the obligation to write, may still remain insu-
lated from social reality. Coetzee, however, is only too ready to 
confess such a pretence. Watt's style, he acknowledges, is "narcis-
sistic reverie." Coetzee knows that the unstated political context 
of such "a book about nothing" is precisely its self-insulation 
from social reality and its attendant responsibilities. 
In Michael K, Coetzee invokes Beckett's aesthetics of nothing-
ness and alludes to the possibility that it may be used as an ex-
cuse for escapism.1' Despite having been ordered off the veld, K 
re-enters it to find himself in a vast empty land where he imag-
ines himself living the rest of his life in a state of Beckettian 
nothingness: 
Sometimes the only sound he could hear was that of his trousers 
whipping together. 
From horizon to horizon the landscape was empty. . . . 
I could live here forever, he thought, or till I die. Nothing would 
happen, everyday would be the same as the day before, there would 
be nothing to say. (Michael K 46) 
A similar moment occurs when, having escaped from the 
Visagie grandson to the mountains, K sits at the mouth of a cave 
and enters a state of Beckettian nothingness: 
Now, in front of his cave, he sometimes locked his fingers behind 
his head, closed his eyes, and emptied his mind, wanting nothing, 
looking forward to nothing. (Michael K6g) 
In both instances, K is tempted to escape from the South Afri-
can historical process into a Beckettian state of nothingness. 
This re-reading of Beckettian aesthetics as insulation from his-
tory provides Coetzee with the fantasy of a Utopian escape from 
the painful dilemmas he experiences as a writer in South Africa. 
Coetzee hints at his desire to escape from history when he re-
counts, in the autobiography, his early ambition to become a 
mathematician: 
As a teenager, this person, this subject, the subject of this story, this 
I . . . decides to become, if at all possible, a scientist, and doggedly 
pursues a career in mathematics, though his talent there is no more 
than modest. How do I read this resolve? I say: he is trying to find a 
capsule in which he can live, a capsule in which he need not 
breathe the air of the world. (Doubling 392-3) 
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Coetzee's escapist longings find occasional expression in K. 
During K's first stay on the Visagie farm, he imagines that he is 
finally living "in a pocket outside time. Cape Town and the war 
[had] slipped further and further into forgetfulness" (MichaelK 
60). During his second stay, K experiences moments in which 
he sees himself "living beyond the reach of calendar and clock 
in a blessedly neglected corner" (Michael K 116). As these 
passages indicate, the attraction of Beckett's aesthetics of 
nothingness for Coetzee lies in its capacity to be adapted into a 
paradigm of historical insulation and escape. 
As noted earlier, the initial "K" is an open-ended sign that 
alludes to multiple prior texts. I would now like to add, on the 
basis of the significant autobiographical echoes in Michael K, 
supplemented by Coetzee's own axiom that "all writing is 
autiobiography," that "K" also alludes to Coetzee himself. 
Coetzee's recent full-length autobiography, Boyhood: Scenes from. 
Provincial Life, makes clear the autobiographical dimension of 
Michael K: K's closeness to his mother, his love of the farm, his 
experiences in the classroom can be traced to Coetzee's child-
hood as revealed by Boyhood. Even as Nadine Gordimer's liter-
alistic orientation leads her to read "K" as referring strictly to 
"Kotze or Koekemoer" (139), which are common names in 
Cape Town, Merivale in a footnote cites Arnim Mennecke's 
observation that "Kotze" is another form of "Coetzee" (165). 
K is also a disguised signature for Coetzee and Michael K is 
in certain respects veiled autobiography. Coetzee's own escapist 
longings find elliptical expression in K's momentary escapes 
from South African history. These episodes of escape are 
conceptualized via a subtle, if private, re-reading of Beckett's 
famous aesthetics of nothingness. 
The lure of formulating an escapist paradigm notwithstand-
ing, Michael K is about the impossibility of total escape. This 
denial of total escape in Coetzee's fiction finds its parallel 
in Coetzee's qualification that Beckett's aesthetic creed of total 
nothingness cannot ultimately be realized: 
The art of Samuel Beckett has become an art of zero, as we all know. 
We also know that an art of zero is impossible. A thousand words 
under a title and a publisher's imprint, the very act of moving pen 
over paper, are affirmations of a kind. (Doubling43) 
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Beckett would be agreeable to Coetzee's qualification to his 
aesthetic creed — he has himself admitted the logical impossi-
bility of an expression of nothing (see Disjecta 139). In his 
personal adaptation of the Beckettian creed, Coetzee does not 
overlook its problematic formulation as a self-contradiction. He 
embraces its internal tension as a means to reflect his historic-
ethical dilemma rather than glossing over it to yield an effective 
formulation of insulation from South African history. 
The impossibility of escape into a state of absolute nothing-
ness is registered in Michael K. Despite being immersed in the 
seeming Beckettian nothingness of the mountains, K does not 
escape history entirely: "Straining his eyes he could sometimes 
make out the dot of a vehicle crawling down the main street of 
the toy town on the plain below" (Michael K 66). The "dot" of 
the vehicle is the minimal, irreducible trace of history and civi-
lization in K's life. Just as "an art of zero is impossible" for the 
writer, total insulation from historical or ethical engagement is 
equally impossible for K. When the Visagie grandson returns to 
repossess the farm, K learns that there is no land in South Af-
rica that has not been colonized by history: "I let myself believe 
that this was one of those islands without an owner. Now I am 
learning the truth. Now I am learning my lesson" (Michael K 
61). In a comment on Michael K, Coetzee notes that "K can't 
hope to keep the garden because, finally, the whole surface of 
South Africa has been surveyed and mapped" ("Two Interviews" 
456). Beckett's aesthetics of nothingness ultimately does not 
translate for Coetzee into a paradigm of historical zero but 
rather into the historical tension and dilemma of moral obliga-
tion despite socio-political impotence and disqualification. 
III. The M i n i m a l Self and Its Evasion of History 
Coetzee's flirting with a U t o p i a n escapism which he ultimately 
does not pursue points us to the constructive political use that 
he does make out of Beckettian aesthetics. If escape into a 
historical zero is neither desirable nor possible, Coetzee never-
theless recognizes that Beckett's aesthetics o f nothingness privi-
leges a radical negating impulse which he interprets as having 
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significant political implications when translated into the South 
African context. One key insight is that Beckett's aesthetics of 
negation can undergird an ideology of dispossession and relin-
quishment. Coetzee for instance re-interprets Beckett's com-
plaint about "ft] he [artist's] malady of wanting to know what to 
do and the malady of wanting to be able to do it" (Disjecta 140) 
in terms of an ideological preference for decolonization and 
relinquishment. Beckett's view that the writer should relinquish 
artistic control, i.e. his famous poetics of failure, is adapted by 
Coetzee into the South African context as effective ideological 
ammunition against the colonial ideology of acquisition and 
control. 
Interestingly, in Michael K, Coetzee does not apply the ideol-
ogy of relinquishment to the colonizer but to the colonized K, 
so that the party who is already dispossessed experiences 
further dispossession. Politics in Michael K is conceived not in 
terms of power acquisition and contestation but in the para-
doxical agency of being able to be dispossessed of history. Re-
linquishing history and yet facing the impossibility of being a 
historical zero, K acquires the politically efficacious state of a 
minimal historical being. 
Michael K's notion of a minimal historical self has distinct 
origins in the Beckett trilogy, particularly Molloy. Molloy is the 
prototypical minimal self, a being in whom negation and relin-
quishment are at work at all possible planes of existence. In 
his body, senses, appetite, locomotion, possessions, knowledge, 
certainty, speech, social stature, Molloy experiences reduction, 
diminishment, decline and deterioration with unvarying con-
sistency. As Molloy recognizes, "the most you can hope is to be a 
little less, in the end, the creature you were in the beginning, 
and the middle" (Molloy 32). Coetzee's K is modeled after 
Beckett's Molloy. On all possible levels of existence — the self, 
body, appetite, sexual desire, needs, wants, daily activities, pos-
sessions, thoughts, consciousness, speech, his engagement with 
history, politics and ideology — K knows what it is like to oper-
ate at the level of the minimal. The medical officer's character-
ization of K as "[t]he obscurest of the obscure," with "[n]o 
papers, no money; no family, no friends, no sense of who you 
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are" (Michael K 142) is a reformulation from Molloy of the po-
lice sergeant's "discovery that [Molloy] had no papers . . . , nor 
any occupation, nor any domicile, that [his] surname escaped 
[him]" (Molloy 22). Coetzee consciously echoes Beckett's trade-
mark reiteration of the negative. K's minimal being is further 
underscored by Coetzee's use of metaphors connoting small-
ness. He is variously referred to as "a little old man" (129), 
"a pebble" (135), "an insect" (135), "an ant" (83), "a termite" 
(66), "a little speck" (g7) "a mouse" (136), "a snail" (112), "a 
parasite dozing in the gut" (116) and " an earthworm" (182). 
Coetzee adapts Beckett's concept of a minimal being into the 
context of South Africa and envisions a political function for 
such a being. Against the supersaturation and inevitability of his-
tory, ideology and politics in South Africa, the minimal being 
has the capacity to limit and even at some points relinquish his 
participation in these "camps" (though he does not enter an ab-
solutely ahistorical realm). Again, K's ability to elude politics via 
his minimal being can be directly traced to characteristics found 
in his predecessor Molloy. We may recall the scene in Molloy 
where, amid the bustle of human activity in Lousse's garden, 
Molloy slips into the indifferent state of an object: 
Men were always busy there, working at I know not what. .. . And in 
the midst of those men I drifted like a dead leaf on springs, or else 
I lay down on the ground, and then they stepped gingerly over me 
as though I had been a bed of rare flowers. (Molloy 52) 
In Michael K, the garden is re-written by Coetzee as the resettle-
ment camp and K, like Molloy, falls into a state of thinglike 
existence: 
K brought his mattress out and lay next to the hut in the shade with 
an arm over his face while the camp lived its life around him. He lay 
so still that the smaller children, having first kept their distance, 
next tried to rouse him, and, when he would not be roused, incor-
porated his body into the game. They clambered over him and fell 
as if he were part of the earth. Still hiding his face, he rolled over 
and found that he could doze even with little bodies riding on his 
back. He found unexpected pleasure in these games. 
(Michael K 84) 
Though interned, K's severely reduced consciousness enables 
him to exist in a pleasurable state of indifference to human 
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activity and history. His minimal appetite frees him from work 
and thus from the exploitation of the resettlement camp: as he 
retorts to the guard, "I don't need to eat all the time. When 
I need to eat, I 'll work" (Michael K 85). The minimal being, 
whose tendency is to relinquish rather than acquire, to lose 
rather than possess, enjoys the freedom of loosing himself from 
the exigencies of politics and history. 
K's detachment from history is of course never absolute. 
Though severely reduced, his state of consciousness is still a 
minimal one rather than a total extinction into nothingness. 
His pleasurable lapse into an indifferent sleep, for example, 
ends when the children find another distraction and desert him 
(Michael K 84-5). The minimal state confers freedom though 
not an absolute freedom. K is never wholly free from hunger 
but insofar as his needs are minimal, he has the freedom to 
choose when and whether he wants to eat. Coetzee maintains a 
distinction between the positive freedom of K's minimal histori-
cal state and the negative utopianism of being in absolute his-
torical nothingness. 
K's freedom lies in the fact that his minimal needs enable 
him to retain agency over his involvement in history. For ex-
ample, at the close of the novel, K thinks: "I have become an 
object of charity.... Everywhere I go there are people waiting to 
exercise their forms of charity on me" (Michael K 181). But K 
intends to elude this objectification of the self: "I have escaped 
the camps; perhaps, if I lie low, I will escape the charity too" 
(MichaelK182). K's refusal to accept patronizing charity recalls 
Molloy's diatribe against the social worker who offers him food 
while he is in prison: 
Let me tell you this, when social workers offer you, free, gratis and 
for nothing, something to hinder you from swooning, which with 
them is an obsession, it is useless to recoil, they will pursue you to 
the ends of the earth, the vomitory in their hands. Against the 
charitable gesture there is no defence, that I know of. You sink your 
head, you put out your hands all trembling and twined together 
and you say, Thank you, thank you lady, thank you kind lady. To 
him who has nothing it is forbidden not to relish filth. (Molloy 24) 
Though Molloy despairs at ever eluding these persistent social 
workers who "pursue you to the ends of the earth," at one point 
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he successfully refuses the charity of a woman at the beach: "I 
think one of them one day, detaching herself from her compan-
ions, came and offered me something to eat and then I looked 
at her in silence, until she went away" (Molloy 75) . In a parallel 
scene in Coetzee's novel, K returns to the coastal Sea Point and 
is charitably offered food by a group of loitering derelicts who 
decide to "adopt" him. Though K accepts some of the food they 
offer, the head-guy, "December," realizes: "It is difficult to 
be kind . . . to a person who wants nothing" (Michael K 179). 
Coetzee rewrites the Beckettian situation of "him who has noth-
ing" into the "person who wants nothing," positively revaluing 
the concept of a self with minimal needs. Such a self is able to 
deny more effectively the objectifying effects of both charities 
and camps exercised upon it, retaining its agency in historical 
participation. 
IV. K's Indeterminate Identity 
In addition to Becket's minimalism, Coetzee also draws on 
Beckett's penchant for epistemological indeterminacy, particu-
larly in Molloy, to formulate, in Michael K, a politics of historical 
evasion. Even as we observe Coetzee's transplantation of 
Beckettian paradigms of indeterminacy into a more emphati-
cally politicized content, we should note that Beckett himself, 
as Coetzee too discerns, had already understood the political 
implications of Molloy's amorphousness. As Molloy wonders, 
"Were [the police] of the opinion that it was useless to 
prosecute me? To apply the letter of the law to a creature like 
me is not an easy matter" (Molloy 24). Molloy, as a result of his 
amorphousness, is particularly effective in escaping the law — 
an idea that is central to Coetzee's conception of K. Molloy's 
elusiveness arises from the difficulty of making names, words or 
labels stick to him; as Molloy observes, "[M]y sense of identity 
was wrapped in a namelessness often hard to penetrate" (Molloy 
31). Moran — Molloy's pursuer and interpreter — is only too 
familiar with Molloy's impenetrable identity: 
Of these two names, Molloy and Mollose, the second seemed to me 
perhaps the more correct. But barely. What I heard, in my soul I 
suppose, where the acoustics are so bad, was a first syllable, Mol, 
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very clear, followed almost at once by a second very thick, as though 
gobbled by the first, and which might have been oy as it might have 
been ose, or one, or even oc. (Molloy 112) 
Molloy, Mollose, Mollone or Molloc? Beckett's text never gives a 
determinate answer as to the identity of its protagonist. In 
Michael K, Coetzee alludes to this indeterminacy of name-end-
ings in the medical officer's confusion of Michael and Michaels, 
in K's own confusion of Prince Albert and Prince Alfred (9), as 
well as in K's inability to determine the name of the owner of 
the farm his mother lived on: is it Mr Vosloo, Mrs Vosloo, Mr 
Visser, or the Visagies (50)? The question of the farm owner's 
identity is never settled and K is never sure whether he success-
fully returns his mother's ashes to the correct farm, leaving in 
suspension the question of her rest (Michael K 116). 
The question asked regarding Molloy — who ultimately is 
he? — could just as well be addressed to Michael K. The core of 
K's identity seems to be wrapped in a similar impenetrable 
namelessness. Coetzee's narrator observes of K that always, 
"when he tried to explain himself to himself, there remained a 
gap, a hole, a darkness before which his understanding 
baulked, into which it was useless to pour words. The words 
were eaten up, the gap remained" (Michael K110). K's identity, 
then, like Molloy's, is resistant to words and naming. Though 
a plethora of labels and identities are applied to K, they are 
"eaten up" and K's fundamental "namelessness" persists. In the 
course of the novel, he is rightly or mistakenly perceived as a 
dutiful son, an idiot, a prisoner, a member of a labor gang, a 
child, a trespasser, a runaway, a savage, a farm servant, a spy, a 
rebel, a gardener. In addition, numerous metaphors are gener-
ated to identify him. The medical officer alone, for example, 
calls K a "stone," "pebble," "parasite," "lizard," "insect," "stick 
insect," "mouse," "duckling," "runt," "fledgling," "rag doll," 
"bunny-rabbit," "coelacanth," "the last man to speak Yaqui," "a 
genuine little man of earth." As Leon de Kock observes: 
Michael K, a South African Houdini, seems to be an escape artist 
from meaning. . . . The terms of meaning, the interpretation, are 
put upon Michael, just as the camps enclose him, yet he slips away 
every time an attempt is made to pin him down. (45) 
J . M . C O E T Z E E A N D S A M U E L B E C K E T T 133 
The "namelessness" at the core of Molloy's identity, which 
makes it useless for the police to prosecute him, is used to 
characterize Michael K i n a context where the political stakes 
are much higher. The political uses of Beckett's paradigm of 
indeterminate identity receive fuller amplification in Coetzee's 
adaptation of Molloy in Michael K. 
Critics generally trace K's ability to evade meaning and inter-
pretation to Coetzee's imaginative and resourceful allegor-
ization of poststructuralist theory. In the passage quoted above, 
for example, the tendency is to see the novel's motif of the 
"gap" or the "hole" as a fictional allegorization of the post-
structuralist concept of absence, a strategic alliance which 
serves to undermine any conception of K's identity as ever 
being whole or fully present. I do not disagree that there is a 
strong poststructuralist register to Coetzee's conception of K. 
In this essay, however, my interest is to point out the text's con-
nection to Beckettian indeterminacy.7 
Coetzee further emphasizes K's indeterminate identity in his 
account of the relationship between Michael K and the medical 
officer, which parallels the relationship between Molloy and 
Moran. In Michael K, the medical officer, burdened with the 
guilt of running the rehabilitation camp, envies K's ability to 
escape from the physical camps and the war. At one point, the 
medical officer imagines how he too could "slip into overalls 
and tennis shoes and clamber over the wall" to become like K, 
leading the hardy existence of a tramp: 
The night that Michaels made his break, I should have followed. It 
is vain to plead that I was not ready. If I had taken Michaels 
seriously I would always have been ready. I would have had a bundle 
at hand at all times, with a change of clothing and a purse full of 
money and a box of matches and a can of sardines. I would never 
have let him out of my sight. When he slept I would have slept 
across the door-sill; when he woke I would have watched. And when 
he stole off I would have stolen off behind him. (Michael K 161) 
The image of the medical officer, traversing the South African 
veld after K in his tennis shoes and a purse of money, recalls the 
middle-class Moran tramping the Irish plains after Molloy The 
medical officer's imagined scenario of how he can become like 
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Michael K echoes Moran's decline from his comfortable cir-
cumstances to a dispossessed state like Molloy's. Like Magda in 
In the Heart of the Country and the Magistrate in Barbarians, the 
medical officer and Michael K are Coetzee's delightful 
additions to Beckett's series of M-characters (Murphy, Molloy, 
Moran, Malone). In addition, the medical officer and Michael 
K, like Moran and Molloy, are intriguingly conceived in a 
relation which involves a play of sameness and difference. 
Critics of Molloy invariably observe that while Moran declines to 
a state that is teasingly similar to Molloy's, the identification 
between the two characters is never complete. Steven Connor 
refers to the "problematic relationship of near-identity" (58) be-
tween Moran and Molloy. For instance, Connor observes that 
while both Molloy and Moran ride bicycles which they 
eventually lose, "Molloy's is green, chainless and without cable-
brakes, while Moran's has no specified color but has a carrier" 
(58). Both Molloy and Moran have problems riding because of 
stiff legs but "Molloy rides his bicycle one-legged [while] Moran 
makes his son do the peddling" (58). In another example, 
Connor notes that 
[B]oth [Molloy and Moran] meet a shepherd, complete with 
shepherd and flock, both ask a question of the shepherd, both 
think about butchering, slaughter and black sheep, and both fall 
into a reverie as they think about what will happen. [However,] 
Molloy is discovered by the shepherd in the morning, while Moran 
comes across the shepherd at evening; Moran receives a reply to his 
question, while Molloy receives no reply. (58-g) 
Beckett teases us with an impression of similarity between 
Molloy and Moran; yet, when we examine the figures more 
closely, we see irreconcilable difference. Leslie Hi l l concludes 
that the relationship between the two "is a case not so much of 
merging identities but aporetic doubling" (68). The play of 
near-identity yet irreconcilable difference between Molloy and 
Moran is one of the chief highlights of Molloy. In Michael K, 
Coetzee echoes this dynamic of near-identity-yet-difference 
when the medical officer imagines himself living in K's dispos-
sessed state, yet still clings to the thought of keeping "a purse 
full of money . . . and a can of sardines." 
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The Moran/Molloy dynamic of near-idendty is subdy incor-
porated into the medical officer's interpretations of K's iden-
tity. The medical officer arrives at a reading of K that seems 
identical to K's own reading of himself. Yet, in the spirit of the 
Moran/Mol loy dynamic, these two readings are ultimately 
suspended in a state of irreconcilable difference. For instance, 
K at one point thinks of himself as being "like a lizard under a 
stone" (116). The medical officer seems to echo K when he 
refers to K "sitting on the grass holding his face up to the sun 
like a lizard basking" (132). Yet, in one case, the lizard is under 
a stone while, in the other, it is basking in the sun. Coetzee 
creates many such pairs of figures, each appearing to suggest 
the medical officer's success in interpreting K as K interprets 
himself, yet ultimately pointing to a persistent gap in the 
medical officer's hermeneutic understanding. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following pair of figurative descriptions of K — the 
first by K himself and the second by the medical officer: 
He thought of himself as a speck upon the surface of an earth too 
deeply asleep to notice the scratch of ant-feet, the rasp of butterfly 
teeth, the tumbling of dust. (Michael Kg'j) 
He is like a stone, a pebble that [has] lain around quietly minding 
its own business since the dawn of time. (Michael K 135) 
In both descriptions, Kis of inorganic geological matter, dimin-
ished in scale and quietly indifferent to events around him. Yet, 
while K is small in both descriptions, he is merely little in one 
but infinitesimal in the other. While K is compared to geologi-
cal matter in both descriptions, he is a "pebble" in one but a 
"speck" in the other. 
Coetzee uses Beckett's Moran/Molloy dynamic to underpin 
the medical officer's hermeneutic relation to Michael K To 
recognize this deliberate intertextual connection is to grasp the 
certainty of the medical officer's hermeneutic failure and of K's 
evasion of hermeneutic capture. The medical officer's herme-
neutic relation to K is asymptotic: while his interpretations 
appear to approach an accurate reading of K, they never fully 
identify the evasive K The medical officer and Michael K, like 
Moran and Molloy, are suspended in a relation of irreconcilable 
difference. By examining Michael K's relation to its precursor text 
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by Beckett, one achieves a more complex understanding of K's 
consummate ability to elude efforts to interpret his identity, an 
ability often mentioned in poststructuralist readings of the novel. 
Unlike certain post-colonial writers who take a more adver-
sarial stance towards their European precursors, Coetzee in 
Michael K does not approach Beckett in a spirit of confronta-
tion, nor are his adaptations of Beckett mechanically derivative. 
Rather, Coetzee is remarkably adept at using the strategies of 
his European modernist precursor to address his own personal 
and historical circumstances. 
NOTES 
1 A m o n g the numerous critics who have commented on Kafka's influence on 
Coetzee's fiction are Attwell, Clayton, Dovey, Penner, Head, and Merivale. Given 
Kafka's widely-observed impact on Coetzee, he becomes a glaring omission from 
Coetzee's "Homage" to the modernists. I would like to speculate that Coetzee's 
omission of Kafka may signal an anxiety in relation to a much venerated precur-
sor. Coetzee's ambivalence toward Kafka is reflected in his often-quoted com-
ment on the use of Kafka in Life Of Times of Michael K: "You ask about the impact 
of Kafka on my own fiction. I acknowledge it, and acknowledge it with what I 
hope is a proper humility. As a writer I am not worthy to loose the latchet of 
Kafka's shoe. But I have no regrets about the use of the letter K in Michael K, 
hubris though it may seem. There is no monopoly in the letter K; or to put it 
another way, it is as much possible to center the universe on the town of Prince 
Albert in the Cape as on Prague" (Doubling 199). Coetzee is far more comfort-
able in acknowledging Beckett's impact on his life and writing. 
2 Coetzee's doctoral thesis is entitled The English Fiction of Samuel Beckett: An Essay 
in Stylistic Analysis. Three of Coetzee's academic essays on Beckett are collected 
in Doubling the Point (31-49). 
3 For a discussion of state-condoned torture in Barbarians, see Gallagher, 112-35. 
•1 Here and elsewhere, I substitute "write" for "paint." 
5 Another example of Beckett's ability to mirror South Africa, in this instance at 
the national level, is suggested by Neil Lazarus' observation of performances of 
Beckett's Waiting for Godot in South Africa: "[W]hen produced in South Africa[,] 
Beckett's play always seems to take on an ulterior life of its own, as though there 
were some inner logic that compelled it in this particular situation to disclose its 
fiercely partisan muscle under its slender existential frame. In a manichean 
society, in which the objects of waiting are starkly different for the powerful and 
the powerless, for rich and poor, white and black, Beckett's play shows itself to 
be unambiguously on the side of the oppressed" (133). Lazarus' comment also 
highlights the oppositional character of Beckett's writing which comes into 
prominence when it is transplanted into South Africa. As we shall see, this is a 
dimension of Beckett that Coetzee also crystallizes in his adaptation of Beckett 
in Michael K. 
6 In his analysis of Barbarians, Lance Olsen calls attention to another echo of 
Beckett's aesthetics of nothingness, when he observes that in the Magistrate's 
narrative, "[w]e are in a monologue with nowhere to go, nothing to say, no one 
to say it to . . . " (55). 
? For a reading that examines the relationship between Michael K and post-
structuralism, see Attwell. 
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